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SME Recovery Following a Financial Crisis: Does Debt Overhang 
Matter? 
 
1. Introduction  
Many causes have been put forward for the recent global financial crisis and preceding 
credit boom including lapses in financial regulation and supervision and financial innovation 
(Cihak et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2013; Masciandaro et al., 2013). Regardless of the cause, one 
undisputed legacy is a large residual stock of outstanding corporate and household debt, in 
particular in severely hit economies in the European periphery such as Ireland and Spain. 
Recently, this large build-up in private debt in many European countries has led to 
expressions of concern that these debt levels may hamper economic growth and recovery 
on an ongoing basis (Elmeskov and Sutherland, 2012; Brown and Lane, 2011).  
 
The existence of these large debt burdens raises questions as to whether such overhangs 
will materially restrict growth prospects as households and firms continue deleveraging. In 
this context, the impact of household leverage and indebtedness following financial crises 
has received attention in the literature (Barrell et al, 2006; Duca et al., 2010), with much less 
work done on the effect of corporate debt overhang following financial crises. Instead, many 
firm-level studies have focused on access to credit issues and the impact of new finance 
availability on investment and employment (Honkapohja, 2014; Holton et al., 2014; Gerlach-
Kristen et al., 2014). One noticeable exception is Davis and Stone (2004) who looked at a 
number of financial crises between 1970 and 1999, finding that investment declines are 
highly correlated with the debt-to-equity ratio following this type of crises. 
 
To address this gap, our paper attempts to provide some evidence on the effect of debt 
overhang and debt sustainability on firm performance using a firm-level survey for Ireland. 
We investigate how debt overhang affects the performance of micro, small-and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) following the recent severe financial crisis. We measure debt 
overhang using a debt-to-turnover ratio and link this ratio to SME economic performance 
(investment and employment) as well as the degree to which SMEs face financial distress 
(loan adjustments, credit rejections, default, trade credit difficulties). We also link debt 
overhang to an index of financial distress which combines the aforementioned variables. In 
this vein, our work is linked to the research which measures financial distress and its 
interaction with credit volumes at the country level (Cevik et al., 2013; Cardarelli et al., 2011; 
Illing and Liu, 2006).   To our knowledge, this is the first study that considers the effect of 
debt overhang on SME performance in a post-crisis setting. It is also the first study to 
explore the relationship between debt overhang and financial distress for SMEs following a 
systemic financial crisis.   
 
3 
Ireland is an interesting case study given the scale of the financial crisis and the serious 
deterioration in the real economy that occurred in the crisis aftermath.  Although the 
growth in house prices and associated increases in household indebtedness are the better 
known features of the Irish credit boom, borrowing by firms also increased at a rapid pace. 
Credit extended to Irish non-financial firms increased from slightly under €50 billion in 2003 
to a peak of €175 billion in 2007, before falling back sharply as the financial crisis and 
recession hit. Exploring the effects of these increases in leverage on the post-crisis firm 
performance should provide important insight into the determinants of corporate recovery 
following financial crises.  
 
Our research is further related to a number of literatures. Firstly it is linked to the research 
on the interaction between private debt balances and the real economy. Private debt stocks 
may affect economic performance through a number of avenues.  For banks to reduce the 
size of their balance sheet to meet stricter capital ratios, they will have to either sell assets 
or reduce lending. This raises the possibility that even creditworthy borrowers may be at risk 
of rejection in their loan applications.  On the demand side of the market, debt overhang can 
put pressure on the firms themselves to deleverage, thus decreasing the incentive to invest 
and reducing demand for credit.  The potentially negative effect of outstanding debt on firm 
investment was first discussed by Myers (1977) and expanded in models such as Lamont 
(1995).  Debt overhang reduces the incentive to invest as the proceeds of any profitable new 
venture could be appropriated by existing debt holders.  This also reduces the incentive for 
lenders to extend new credit to a firm with considerable existing liabilities.   
 
Despite this channel there has been little study of direct effects of outstanding debt levels 
and debt sustainability at firm level.  While Holton, Lawless and McCann (2014) showed that 
links exist between firm credit constraints and aggregate private debt to GDP ratios and the 
cost of funding for governments and banks, they did not examine the effects of the debt 
stocks or debt sustainability of the firms themselves 
 
Some evidence that debt overhang has negative consequences for investment decisions in 
larger listed firms has been found by Hennessy (2004).  Due to data limitations, the Tobin’s Q 
approach used by Hennessy is difficult to apply to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as 
they are generally unlisted.  However, in the context of the financial crisis, it is the SME 
sector that has been the main focus of policy concern as these firms are considerably more 
reliant on local banks as a source of funding than larger firms. Focusing again on listed 
enterprises, Aivazian et al. (2005) examine the impact of leverage on firms’ investment 
activities on a sample of Canadian firms. They find that leverage has a negative effect on 
investment and the effect is greater for firms with lower growth opportunities (as measured 
by Tobin’s Q). They state that the results support the agency theory of leverage which plays 
a disciplining role on leveraged firms.  
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Cai and Zhang (2011) use data on US listed firms and document a negative and significant 
effect of increased leverage ratios on firm performance (investment, default risk and stock 
performance). Long-lasting effects of a credit crunch on firm investment were found 
following the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s (Coulibaly and Millar, 2008, 2011).  
Moyen (2007) examines the debt overhang investment relationship in an analytical model 
accounting for debt maturity and flexible investment. Their model suggests 
underinvestment associated with debt overhang is more severe as investment opportunities 
are lower as opportunities improve.  
 
A number of other studies are related to our research. Coricelli, Driffield, Pal and Roland 
(2010, 2012) find that having some debt has a positive effect on firm productivity as it 
facilitates investment but that excessive leverage has the opposite effect, increasing the 
likelihood of financial distress and hampering productivity.  Costanzo, Silipo and Succurro 
(2013) find a similar type of relationship between indebtedness and innovation, with an 
initially positive effect of debt on ability to invest in innovative technologies turning negative 
if the firm becomes overleveraged. 
 
Given this existing research, we make a number of contributions. This paper uses firm-level 
survey data to examine how debt overhang at the beginning of the survey period affected 
the subsequent performance of the firm. Our dataset contains mainly SMEs, which have not 
been studied in this context of debt overhang in the existing literature.  Our measurement of 
indebtedness is also distinct from previous research that uses the leverage ratio (debt-to-
assets). Here we focus on both the level of outstanding debt and the debt burden (measured 
as the ratio of debt to turnover). We then test the impact of the volume and burden of debt 
on employment changes and investment decisions of the firm, controlling for a range of 
other characteristics. To date no research has undertaken such an evaluation for SMEs 
following the recent financial crisis.   
 
Using a debt-to-turnover ratio is similar to the debt-to-income ratio used in the household 
finance literature (Dynan, 2012; Mian et al., 2011; 2012; 2013). Using such a measure is a 
departure from the corporate finance literature which mainly measures debt overhang using 
a debt-to-asset ratio. There are a number of reasons to believe that our measure is a more 
appropriate in the context of financial crises. Firstly, firm assets are priced to book values on 
the balance sheet and these do not capture the potential valuation changes that may occur 
following excess volatility in real estate prices. Second, while debt to asset measures may 
capture firm solvency, the relative size of generated resources (turnover) relative to debt 
may provide a more accurate representation of the firm’s liquidity position and hence its 
current performance.  
 
A number of findings emerge. While the level of debt is generally associated with positive 
firm performance (higher employment growth and investment), higher debt burdens 
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measured as the level of debt relative to turnover, on the contrary, have significant negative 
effects on all measures of firm performance. This suggests that potential problems with debt 
sustainability and overstretching of earlier credit commitments have a material effect on the 
investment and employment growth of domestic SMEs. We also find that higher levels of 
debt-to-turnover are associated with higher credit constraints and default rates as well as 
higher levels of our financial distress index.  
 
These effects are non-uniformly distributed across the economy and are different for 
employment and investment channels. For employment growth, we find that the effects are 
higher for small and micro firms with medium sized firms unaffected. Looking across sectors, 
we find that the wholesale and retail sector is the most affected. For investment, the effects 
are greatest for older firms, medium-sized firms and those in the manufacturing sector. For 
both investment and employment outcomes, we find that exporters are more affected than 
non-exporters.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the data and 
summary statistics, Section 3 presents the empirical results on the effects of debt overhang 
on firm employment and investment and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
In this research we use data from a credit supply and demand survey of Irish SMEs 
completed by the Irish government’s Department of Finance. This survey has been 
undertaken on a six monthly basis since the crisis to provide an understanding of how firm 
access to finance and performance has developed. The questions included are similar to 
those of international surveys such as the ECB/EC SAFE survey and the EBRD/World Bank 
enterprise surveys. Information is collected on applications and success rates for bank and 
non-bank finance as well as a range of categorical information on firm size, sector, 
performance (in terms of profitability and turnover), innovation activity (product, process 
and organisational), whether or not the firm is an exporter and financial capacities. 
Additional data is also collated on whether or not the firm has missed a loan repayment in 
the last size months, had a formal adjustment/arrangement made to their current loans, and 
whether or not the timing on their accounts receivable and payables changed.  
 
The Irish economy since the 2008 financial crisis provides an interesting case study in which 
to test the effect of debt overhang on firm performance. In the period prior to 2007 Irish 
corporate balance sheets expanded significantly. With the onset of the banking crisis and its 
knock-on effects on the real economy, SMEs faced large reductions in demand for their 
goods and services (See O’Connell et al., 2012 for an overview of the development of the 
Irish domestic economy following the crisis). Coupled with the reduction in sales from the 
economic crisis, a reduction in real estate values of circa 50 percent (Kennedy and McQuinn, 
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2012) has caused considerable losses on property investments and reduced the value of 
available collateral. The concurrent impact of these factors has led to a position where many 
Irish SMEs are potentially carrying large debt overhangs. Our aim is to investigate the effect 
of the sustainability of these liabilities on firm economic performance and risk of financial 
distress. 
 
To assess the effect of indebtedness on Irish SMEs, a special module was included to capture 
information on the total outstanding debt levels of SMEs and continuous information on 
turnover, employment and investment. The data is available for two survey waves in the 
periods: from October 2012 to March 2013 and also from April 2013 to September 2013.  
The outstanding debt data refers to total liabilities on the firm’s balance sheet and cannot be 
separated by term structure or source.  
 
In evaluating the effects of debt overhang on SME performance, it is firstly informative to 
review the distribution of debt holders across the sample. Figure 1 provides an overview of 
the distribution of debt holders overall, by firm age categories, by firm size and by whether 
or not the firms undertake innovation or export.  
Figure 1 Table Distribution of Debt Holders Amongst Irish SMEs 
Share of Firms Holding Debt Statistics by Firm Age 
  
Debt by Industrial Sector Debt by Firm Size, Exporter and Innovation 
 
 
Source: Department of Finance Survey 
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About 69 percent of firms indicate that they have some financial debt on their balance 
sheet. Younger firms (less than five years of age) are the least likely to have financial debt at 
65 percent while there is little variation across higher age categories.  
 
On the sectoral distribution of firm debt holding, the highest share of SMEs with formal debt 
is in the hotels sector, while the lowest is in construction and real estate. That the 
construction sector is the lowest may appear surprising given the scale of the property boom 
in Ireland. However, given that our data are collected nearly four years into the crisis, a large 
number of highly indebted construction firms have to date become insolvent and ceased 
trading. There is therefore a survivor bias in our cross-sectional data towards lower-debt 
construction firms.  
 
Focusing on firm size, we consider three categories: micro (less than 10 employees), small 
(between 10 and 49 employees), and medium-sized firms (between 50 and 250 employees). 
Micro firms are less likely to have balance sheet debt while there does not appear to be 
differences between small and medium-sized firms. We also find that exporters appear to be 
more likely to have debt and also that firms that undertake innovation are more likely to be 
indebted.  
 
Figure 2 Debt Volumes (Log) by Firm Groups for Irish SMEs 
Debt Volumes by Age Debt Volumes by Size 
  
Debt Volumes by Sector Debt Volumes Exporter and Innovation 
 
 
Source: Department of Finance Survey 
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Figure 2 presents the intensive margin of debt volumes for Irish firms using the sample of 
firms with positive debt. A clear pattern emerges with debt increasing with firm size. 
However, there does not appear to be any clear patterns across firm age: the highest 
volumes are reported for the oldest firm group (greater than 20 years of age).  Debt volumes 
are highest in the hotels and manufacturing sectors. Debt levels are higher for exporting 
firms but no discernible difference is evident between innovative and non-innovative firms.1  
 
Our main research question is to investigate whether debt overhang from the financial crisis 
is Ireland is affecting firms’ economic performance and financial distress. To test this 
hypothesis, we use a debt-to-turnover ratio. In our data, the survey information is designed 
to cover the operations of the firm for the previous six months. However, for the debt data, 
we have information on the volume of debt measured at the beginning of the six month 
period. We use this as the numerator in our key ratio as including beginning period data 
should deal with issues relating to reverse causality in the period between debt and 
economic and financial performance.  
Figure 3 Debt-to-Turnover Ratio by Firm Groups for Irish SMEs 
Debt Volumes by Age Debt Volumes by Size 
 
 
Debt Volumes by Sector Debt Volumes Exporter and Innovation 
 
 
Source: Department of Finance Survey 
                                                            
1  Innovative firms are defined as those that responded that they introduced new or substantially improved 
products or services over the preceding six-month period or made significant changes to their production or 
business process. 
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The average values of the debt-to-turnover ratio across firm groups are presented in Figure 
3. Younger firms appear to have the lowest debt to turnover ratio. This is unsurprising in our 
data as, given this age category is measured as less than five years, the time period for the 
survey would indicate all these firms have been established since the financial crisis. It is 
therefore unlikely that they have property legacy debt. Interestingly the debt to turnover 
ratio is higher for micro-firms than small firms. Medium-sized firms have the highest debt-
to-turnover ratios. Splitting the data by sector, we find that the hotels sector has the highest 
debt to turnover ratio with construction firms second.  
 
To model the effects of debt overhang on firm economic and financial performance, we use 
a range of variables as controls or outcome variables of interest which are presented in 
detail in the next section. We provide a brief overview and summary statistics for these 
variables. As the majority of the questions in our data are categorical, we develop a number 
of indicator variables to include in our empirical estimations. To capture the demand side of 
the firms operations and to control for borrower-specific profitability that may determine 
economic or financial performance, we include controls for whether or not the firm had 
positive turnover “Turnover Up”, whether or not they export, whether or not they 
undertook either product, process, organisational or marketing innovation, or posted a net 
profit or loss in the past six months.  
 
Relating to the financial distress of SMEs, we use a range of indicators. We have information 
as to whether or not the firm was rejected a loan application in the six months prior to the 
survey information “Past rejection” as well as whether a loan application was rejected 
during the six month time frame of the survey (“Credit rejected”). Past rejection is used as a 
control in the employment and investment models while credit rejection is part of our 
assessment of financial distress. We include a measure of default which captures whether or 
not the firm missed a loan repayment in the last six months as well as a control for whether 
or not the firm received a formal bank adjustment on their outstanding debt balances. 
Additional controls for age, size and sector are included.  Given the importance of trade 
credit to financing firms during financial crises, in particular in Ireland (Casey and O’Toole, 
2014; Lawless et al., 2013), we also include a measure of if there has been an increase in the 
number of days taken to pay suppliers or to collect payments from customers. 
 
The summary statistics that describe our sample and provide information on these variables 
are presented in Table 1. Additional summary statistics are presented in table A1 in Annex 1. 
The total sample size is approximately 2,087. The average values for the variables are also 
split out for whether or not the firms report positive debt. We provide a simple t-test 
comparison of the mean values between firms that hold debt and those that do not.  
 
The composition of our sample is as follows: just under 40 percent of firms are micro 
enterprises, with a further 40 percent small and the final 20 percent medium-sized. Only 5 
10 
percent of the data are firms under 5 years of age, 14 percent are aged between 5 and 10 
years, 28 percent between 11 and 20 years and over 50 percent are aged greater than 20 
years. The highest sectoral representation is wholesale and retail covering 32 percent of the 
firms with hotels and construction the lowest on 11 percent.  
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics For Main Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Overall 
Mean 
Mean if Debt 
= 0 
Mean if Debt > 
0 
T-stat ((2) = 
(3)) 
Turnover up 0.30 0.29 0.32 -1.43 
Export 0.20 0.21 0.21 -0.06 
Innovation 0.53 0.50 0.56 -2.62 *** 
Profit  0.44 0.47 0.45 1.08 
Loss 0.22 0.18 0.23 -2.68 *** 
Past rejection 0.06 0.03 0.07 -4.77 *** 
Credit rejected 0.07 0.04 0.08 -4.14 *** 
Receivable Days Increased 0.31 0.29 0.33 -2.07 ** 
Payable Days Increased 0.17 0.10 0.20 -6.16 *** 
Less than five years  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.99 
 Between 5 and 10 years  0.14 0.14 0.14 0.26 
Between 11 and 20 years  0.28 0.29 0.27 0.81 
Greater than 20 years  0.53 0.52 0.54 -1.33 
Micro  0.39 0.43 0.36 3.02 *** 
Small  0.39 0.36 0.40 -1.93 * 
Medium  0.22 0.21 0.23 -1.27 
Manuf.  0.12 0.12 0.14 -1.22 
Const & Real Estate  0.11 0.13 0.11 1.37 
Wholesale and retail  0.32 0.30 0.34 -2.04 ** 
Hotels  0.11 0.08 0.12 -2.68 *** 
Other 0.33 0.37 0.30 3.69 *** 
Source: Authors’ analysis using Department of Finance survey data: N = 2,087.  
 
On the financial distress variables, we observe that circa 7 percent of firms are credit 
constrained (rejections of formal loan applications). Nearly 45 percent of firms posted a 
profit while 22 percent posted losses. Over 30 percent of firms experienced an increase in 
the number of days that suppliers pay them for goods provided on credit while 17 percent of 
firms increased the number of days that they said they delayed payment to suppliers for.   
These indicators were significantly higher for firms holding debt compared to debt-free 
firms.   
 
While it provides insight to consider each of these distress indicators individually, we also 
calculate an index of financial distress, which is the simple sum of the binary indicators for 
each of the above factors: a) credit rejected b) loss making c) trade credit days increased d) 
missed a loan repayment e) received a loan adjustment. In this regard our research is 
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complementary to the work that measures financial distress at an aggregate level (Cevik et 
al., 2013; Cardarelli et al., 2011; Illing and Liu, 2006). Due to a lack of observations, we cap 
the index at 4. This index should provide insight into the degree to which Irish SMEs are 
facing financial distress. Summary statistics for the index by firm characteristics is presented 
in Table 2.  
 
The index values indicate that over 44 percent of Irish firms do not appear to suffer any 
financial distress as measured. The groups with the lowest share of firms facing financing 
constraints are micro firms, young firms (less than 5 years) and firms in the construction 
sector. In general less than 2 percent of Irish firms are captured at the highest point in the 
financial distress index.  
 
Table 2 Financial Distress Index – Summary Statistics 
 
Index Value (0 =  no indication of stress, 4 =  max) 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 N 
Overall 44.42 32.01 16.05 5.65 1.87 2087 
Micro 41.33 32.6 18.08 5.78 2.21 813 
Small 44.29 33.25 14.89 6.08 1.49 806 
Medium 50 28.85 14.53 4.7 1.92 468 
Age < 5 40.63 32.29 21.88 5.21 0 96 
Age 5 -10 51.52 28.62 13.47 4.71 1.68 297 
Age 11-20 47.35 30.26 15.21 4.96 2.22 585 
Age 20 + 41.3 33.81 16.68 6.31 1.89 1109 
Manu 46.47 31.97 15.24 5.2 1.12 269 
C & RE 40.57 34.43 16.8 6.15 2.05 244 
W & R 41.85 34.23 16.44 5.53 1.94 669 
Hotels 45.33 24.3 20.56 8.41 1.4 214 
Other 47.18 31.4 14.33 4.92 2.17 691 
Source: Authors’ analysis using Department of Finance survey data 
 
3. Effects of Debt Overhang on Firm Performance 
3.1 Specifications  
The key focus of this paper is to examine the effects of outstanding debt burdens on the 
performance of firms, as measured by developments in firm-level employment, investment 
and their financial distress.  To measure employment performance, we an indicator variable 
describing if employment has increased, decreased or remained unchanged over the 
previous six month period.  For investment, we use two measures: we first use a binary 
variable to indicate if the firm has invested in a fixed asset in the previous six months and 
secondly examine the level of investment spending. To test the effects of debt overhang on 
financial distress we estimate equations both for the overall financial distress index and 
separate models for each of the subcomponents. The different specifications and 
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corresponding econometric approaches appropriate to each dependent variable are 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
In the first specification, we examine if debt overhang has a relationship with changes in firm 
employment in the current period.  Although we do not have panel data to calculate exact 
changes in the number of workers, respondents to the survey are asked whether in the last 
six months they increased, maintained or decreased employment levels. Given the 
categorical nature of the three-point scale of the dependent variable, designated  
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖, we estimate the following equation using an ordered probit regression:  𝐸𝑚𝑝𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝜙𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡i𝑙𝑎𝑔 +  ω𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛i +  𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝐿𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡i
𝑙𝑎𝑔 is the log of the outstanding debt of the firm at the start of the period,  
𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖  is the debt burden relative to the turnover of the firm and Xi is a vector of other 
firm controls, which will be described in the next subsection. 
 
Following employment changes, the second aspect of firm performance that we want to 
investigate is current investment decisions, where outstanding debt burdens could be 
expected to prove an obstacle.   Firms were asked if they purchased any fixed assets in the 
previous six months, and if they did were further asked what their total expenditure was on 
these assets. This allows us to identify whether or not a firm actually purchased capital 
assets and the level of such investment. We look separately at these two elements to 
examine if debt burdens are having an effect on investment and, if they do, if these effects 
are operating at the intensive margin by preventing investment or at the extensive margin 
by reducing investment expenditures. 
 
We model the probability that a firm decides to invest using a dummy variable 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖  
which takes a value of 1 if the firm is observed to have positive investment spending over 
the period and zero otherwise:    
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 = �1 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑖∗ > 00 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑖∗ ≤ 0   
We then run a probit regression with the investment dummy as our dependent variable, 
controlling for debt levels, debt burden and other firm characteristics:   𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝜙𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡i𝑙𝑎𝑔 +  ω𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛i +  𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 
Our final specification models the investment level as a function of the debt and firm 
characteristics as in the other specifications.  Given that investment spending is only 
observed when an investment decision is taken (and we cannot observe any disinvestment 
by the firm through asset sales or amount of depreciation), this variable is censored at zero.  
To control for this censoring, we use a Tobit regression with robust standard errors to 
estimate the investment expenditure: 
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𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝜙𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡i𝑙𝑎𝑔 +  ω𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛i +  𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
The final set of specifications examines the link between the debt-to-turnover ratio and the 
indicators of financial distress discussed earlier.  As the data is from a cross-sectional survey, 
we cannot directly measure if debt overhang is resulting in firm failure.  However, the tests 
of the effect of debt overhang on these other measures of firm financial health should give 
some useful indications of the extent to which debt is causing difficulties for firms.  The 
specification for each of the indicators of financial difficulties is a probit model for the binary 
indicator and, in addition, a combined index which will be modelled both using a 
multinomial logit specification and an ordered count specification:   
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝜙𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡i𝑙𝑎𝑔 +  ω𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛i +  𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where Distress is proxied by a) firms that had a credit application rejected b) firms that 
default c) firms that increase the time to pay accounts outstanding, d) firms that experience 
increases in the time to receive payment and e)  firms that receive a loan adjustment. The 
index of financial distress is the simple sum of the binary indicators for each of the factors. 
The explanatory variables for each of the specifications are outlined in the next section. 
3.2 Explanatory Variables  
Our main variables of interest, in terms of their effects on the employment and investment 
performance of the firm as well as financial distress, are the outstanding stock of debt and 
debt burden.  We use the log of the debt of the firm at the beginning of the six month survey 
period as our debt variable. As noted, using the beginning period values should deal with 
any reverse causality that runs from debt to economic/financial outcomes within the period. 
However, due to the cross-sectional nature of the data we have not been able to use an 
explicit methodology to control for endogeneity that arises from omitted variables. 
However, including a large range of firm and other controls we hope mitigates this effect 
somewhat. The impact of the debt value variable on firm performance is ambiguous as the 
firm may have taken out this debt to finance expansion and to take advantage of business 
opportunities that have facilitated growth.  On the other hand, if the firm took on excessive 
debt during the credit boom period, this could hamper current performance. The level of 
debt therefore does not have an obvious relationship with firm performance.   
 
The extent to which the firm’s debt can be regarded as a burden or at levels that may be 
unsustainable is better captured by comparing the stock of debt to the current turnover of 
the firm.  We use this debt-to-income ratio as a measure of the extent to which the firm can 
service its debt obligations and hence to estimate more accurately if the firm is being 
constrained in its current performance by historic credit overhang. 
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We include a range of other firm characteristics as controls.  Firm age group indicators are 
included to control for differences in lifecycle growth stages and also to capture to some 
extent prior bank credit access.  Berger and Udell (1998) discuss how firm financing options 
vary over the life cycle with younger firms less likely to be in a position to have taken out 
bank credit due to information asymmetries in the banking system. For the specifications on 
firm investment, we include categories of firm size as an additional control.  Our reference 
category is micro firms (i.e. those with fewer than 10 employees) and we report the effects 
of firms being in the small category (between 10 and 50 employees) and of being in the 
medium category (between 50 and 250 employees).  As the survey specifically targets SMEs, 
there are no large firms in the data we use. 
 
In the employment regressions, we do not include size categories based on the number of 
employees due to reverse causality concerns. Instead, we use categories based on turnover 
instead. Higher turnover firms should be in a stronger position to take on and service higher 
levels of debt.  We include a categorical variable for the turnover of the firm where the 
reference group is firms with turnover of less than €2 million and the reported categories 
are firms with between €2 million and €20 million, and firms with between €20 million and 
€50 million in turnover.  We also include a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm has 
experienced an increase in its turnover in the past six months.  Further controlling for firm 
performance is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has seen an increase in its profits 
over the same period. 
 
The firm’s growth opportunities are further controlled for by including its export status and 
current innovation processes.  The exporter variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm had any foreign sales in the past six months and equal to 0 if all sales were to the 
domestic market.  The innovation dummy is equal to 1 if the firm responded that it had 
introduced any new (or significantly improved) products or services or had developed any 
new methods of production or major changes in business practices over the six month 
period referred to by the survey. 
 
Financial pressure on the firm is proxied by a repayment problem variable, which is defined 
as the firm having missed any payment on its loans in the survey period.  We would expect 
this to be negatively related to the growth performance of the firm and to reduce the 
likelihood that they would be able to purchase new assets if this relied on credit availability. 
This variable is not included in the financial distress regressions as it forms part of the index. 
Finally, as mentioned in the previous section, we include a dummy variable for whether or 
not the firm was rejected for credit in the period prior to the survey wave to capture the 
effect of past rejections on current performance.  
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3.3 Results  
This section discusses the results of our various specifications for the effect of outstanding 
debt and debt burdens on the employment and investment performance of SMEs.  We also 
look at how debt affects the probability of the firm encountering a range of indicators of 
financial distress. Linking debt overhang to firm performance is an important aspect in 
developing our understanding of the recovery paths for corporate following systemic 
financial crises.  
Debt overhang and employment – overall effects 
Table 3 presents the baseline estimates for the ordered probit for a change in employment 
over the previous six months.  The outstanding debt stock of the firm at the beginning of the 
period is found to have a positive and significant effect on the probability of unchanged or 
increasing employment over the survey reference period.  We find evidence therefore that 
higher debt does not necessarily generate a drag on firm performance but rather can 
facilitate firm growth.  The level of debt itself is not a good indicator of the affordability of 
that debt or of financial pressure at the firm.    
Table 3 Modelling the Effect of Debt Sustainability on 
Employment – Marginal Effects  
  
Employment Change 
 (Ordered Probit) 
Age 5- 10 
 
0.005 
Age 11-20 
 
0.018 
Age 20 + 
 
-0.021 
Turnover – mid 
 
0.002 
Turnover - high 
 
0.014 
Const and RE 
 
-0.001 
Wholesale & Retail 
 
0.017 
Hotels 
 
-0.006 
Other 
 
0.029 
Increase Turnover 
 
0.192*** 
Exporter 
 
0.021 
Innovation 
 
-0.008 
Profit Increased 
 
0.111*** 
Default 
 
-0.041* 
Credit Rejected 
 
-0.032 
Log Debt t-1 
 
0.014** 
D/Y 
 
-0.199** 
N 
 
2,018 
 
We therefore look to our measure of firm debt burden – the ratio of debt to firm turnover – 
to give us a better indication of whether the firm is over-extended.  This is found to have a 
significant negative impact on firm employment growth.  The negative consequences of debt 
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overhang can be clearly seen, but it is the presence of excessive debt relative to the scale of 
the firm’s operations that have the hampering effect and not the level of debt itself that has 
this effect.  
Looking at the other firm characteristics, we do not find a significant relationship between 
firm age and changes in employment.  Higher turnover categories are not found to have any 
effect on the probability of the firm increasing or decreasing employment in the current 
period.  However, an increase in turnover is positively and significantly related to the 
likelihood of the firm expanding its workforce as one would expect.   No relationship is found 
between these broad sector indicators and the increase or decrease in employment over the 
prior six month period.   
Debt overhang and employment – effects by firm group  
The baseline results showed a strong negative effect of debt burden on the probability of an 
employment change.  We next look at a number of interactions of the debt-to-turnover ratio 
with other firm characteristics to investigate if these effects vary across different firm 
groups.  Table 4 shows the results of these interactions, where each panel is a separate 
specification also controlling for all of the firm characteristics reported in Table 3.  The 
coefficients reported are the combined marginal effects taking into account the direct effect 
of the debt-to-turnover as well as the interaction effect.    
Table 4 Modelling the Effect of Debt Sustainability on 
Employment – Marginal Effects (for Ordered Probit)  
  
Employment 
Change (OP) 
Effects by Age 
D/Y x Age 0-5 
 
-0.205** 
D/Y x Age 6-10 
 
-0.193** 
D/Y x Age 11 -20 
 
-0.201*** 
D/Y x Age 20 + 
 
-0.196** 
Effects by Sector 
D/Y x Manufacturing 
 
-0.170* 
D/Y x Const and RE 
 
-0.150 
D/Y x Wholesale & Retail 
 
-0.217*** 
D/Y x Hotels 
 
-0.195** 
D/Y x Other 
 
-0.193** 
Effects by Size 
D/Y x Micro 
 
-0.171** 
D/Y x Small 
 
-0.181* 
D/Y x Medium 
 
-0.065 
Exporting 
D/Y x Non-Exporter 
 
-0.207** 
D/Y x Exporter 
 
-0.221** 
Innovation 
D/Y x No Innovation 
 
-0.200*** 
D/Y x Innovation 
 
-0.194** 
N 
 
2,018 
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For almost all interactions, the effect is negative and significant.  The most notable 
interactions are that we find a larger effect for exporters indicating that they may be 
particularly constrained by the presence of outstanding debt burdens but there is no 
evidence of different effects for innovating compared to non-innovating firms.  
 
The effects on a change in employment of debt burdens do not show any particular variation 
when interacted with firm age categories, although in this case we do see some differences 
across firm size groups.  Medium firms are one of the only groups that have an insignificant 
total effect when combined with the debt burden measure.   The negative effect remains 
significant however for both micro and small firms.  
 
The sample can also be split by sector to examine if the greater credit expansion in some 
sectors during the boom, particularly in Construction and Real Estate, can be linked to a 
greater effect of debt-to-income ratios relative to other sectors.  The effect of the debt-to-
income ratio is significantly negative for all sectors with the one exception being 
Construction.  The effect is largest for firms in the Wholesale and Retail sector.  
Debt overhang and investment   
Table 5 presents the result of the investment specifications, with column (1) showing the 
probit results for if the firm invests or not and column (2) showing results for the Tobit 
regressions on investment amounts.  The existing debt stock of the firm is found to actually 
have a positive, statistically significant, effect on the decision to invest in new fixed assets 
and on the amount invested.  As in the employment results, the level of existing debt 
appears to be picking up positive business opportunities and facilitating firm growth rather 
than acting as a brake as one might have expected from a debt overhang interpretation. 
 
However, debt affordability operates in the opposite direction. The ratio of existing debt to 
firm turnover has a significantly negative effect on both the decision to invest and on the 
volume if investment occurs.  As we do not have more detailed information on the 
investment opportunities of the firm in terms of their risk or return potential, it would be 
overly strong to interpret this negative coefficient on debt-to-income as preventing the firm 
from being able to take advantage of growth opportunities but it does give an indication that 
previous credit build-up can restrict the current options open to the firm. 
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Table 5 Modelling the Effect of Debt Sustainability on Investment – Marginal Effects 
 
Extensive Margin (Probit) Intensive Margin (Tobit) 
 
b/se b/se 
Age 5- 10 -0.091* -2.786 
Age 11-20 -0.080* -2.626* 
Age 20 + -0.083* -2.549 
Small 0.120*** 5.478*** 
Medium 0.343*** 12.085*** 
Const and RE -0.019 -0.465 
Wholesale & Retail -0.045 -1.869* 
Hotels -0.044 -1.597 
Other 0.013 0.333 
Increase Turnover 0.042** 1.481** 
Exporter 0.129*** 4.372*** 
Innovation 0.064*** 2.507*** 
Profit Increased 0.044** 1.853*** 
Default -0.057 -2.625 
Credit Rejected -0.058 -2.507 
Log Debt t-1 0.025** 1.135*** 
D/Y -0.382** -16.825*** 
N 2,087 2,073 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** indicates significance at % level,  ** at 5% and 
* at 10%. 
 
Other firm characteristics positively associated with investment occurring and its level are 
the size of the firm, with small and medium firms more likely to invest and to invest larger 
amounts than micro firms.  Exporters and firms with increased profits in the survey period 
are also more likely to invest.  In contrast to our finding for employment growth, innovation 
activity has a strong positive coefficient for both investment specifications, showing a 
stronger link existing between innovation and capital expenditures than with employment 
changes. 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the total effects of debt burden combined with its interaction 
with a range of firm characteristics as we did above in the employment specification.  The 
negative effects of debt burdens on investment probability and volume are similar across 
firm age groups, with the oldest firms being slightly more strongly affected than younger 
firms. Looking at sectors, although the effect is negative and significant for all, the 
magnitude of the effect is largest for manufacturing firms.  The probability of investing is 
most strongly affected by debt burdens for medium sized firms, but the effect on investment 
volumes is similar across all size groups. 
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Debt overhang and investment - effects by firm group 
 
Table 6 Modelling the Effect of Debt Sustainability on Investment – Marginal Effects  
 
Extensive Margin (Probit) Intensive Margin (Tobit) 
Effects by Age 
D/Y x Age 0-5 -0.415** -16.319** 
D/Y x Age 6-10 -0.392** -17.304*** 
D/Y x Age 11 -20 -0.337** -15.109** 
D/Y x Age 20 + -0.432*** -18.730*** 
Effects by Sector 
D/Y x Manufacturing -0.457*** -19.221*** 
D/Y x Const and RE -0.336** -15.177** 
D/Y x Wholesale & Retail -0.334** -16.582*** 
D/Y x Hotels -0.301* -14.761** 
D/Y x Other -0.444*** -18.450*** 
Effects by Size 
D/Y x Micro -0.322** -17.006*** 
D/Y x Small -0.454** -17.364** 
D/Y x Medium -0.556** -17.336** 
Exporting 
D/Y x Non-Exporter -0.386*** -17.192*** 
D/Y x Exporter -0.498*** -18.329*** 
Innovation 
D/Y x No Innovation -0.344** -16.113*** 
D/Y x Innovation -0.425*** -17.649*** 
N 2,087 2,073 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** indicates significance at % level, ** at 5% and * 
at 10%. 
 
Debt overhang and financial distress  
The final set of results show the effects of outstanding debt levels and debt-to-turnover 
ratios on the likelihood of a firm experiencing various indicators of financial difficulties.  
Table 7 shows probit regressions for each of the indicators individually: a) firms that had a 
credit application rejected b) firms that default c) firms that increase the time to pay 
accounts outstanding, d) firms that experience increases in the time to receive payment and 
e)  firms that receive a loan adjustment. 
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Table 7 Marginal Effects of Probit Model: Debt sustainability and firm financial performance 
 
Credit 
rejected Default 
Payable 
Days Inc 
Receivable 
Days Inc 
Loan 
Adjustments 
Age 5- 10 0.007 0.006 -0.030 0.026 -0.022 
Age 11-20 0.021 0.017 -0.013 0.020 0.004 
Age 20 + 0.017 0.013 -0.050 0.073 0.013 
Small 0.014 -0.058*** -0.014 0.031 -0.053*** 
Medim -0.003 -0.080*** 0.002 -0.003 -0.064*** 
Const and RE 0.022 0.026 0.001 0.060 0.025 
Wholesale & 
Retail 0.006 0.013 0.010 0.023 0.001 
Hotels 0.047* 0.080*** 0.028 -0.186*** 0.074** 
Other 0.035** 0.026* -0.012 0.033 0.018 
Increase 
Turnover 0.001 -0.018* -0.003 -0.037 -0.010 
Exporter 0.019 0.029* -0.015 0.023 -0.001 
Innovation 0.018* -0.001 0.049*** 0.031 0.029** 
Profit Increased -0.022* -0.016 -0.125*** -0.025 -0.029** 
Log Debt t-1 -0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.011 0.009** 
D/Y 0.103* 0.152** 0.103 0.196 0.076 
N 2,087 2,087 2,087 2,087 2,087 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** indicates significance at % level, ** at 5% and * 
at 10%. 
  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, but in line with the results on employment changes and investment, 
the level of debt is not a statistically significant factor in explaining credit rejections, default 
or payment problems.  The only indicator of financial difficulties where the probability 
increases with the level of debt is that of an adjustment in the loan arrangement.  The debt-
to-turnover ratio, on the other hand, is a significant factor in increasing the probability of 
having new credit applications rejected and increasing the probability of missing debt 
payments. It does not, however, have a significant effect on the cash flow or loan 
adjustment measures.   
 
Looking at the relationships between other firm characteristics and the indicators of 
financial difficulty, we see that small and medium sized firms have negative and significant 
coefficients in the regressions for default and loan adjustments, meaning that micro firms 
are the most likely to experience these outcomes.  The other measures were not affected by 
firm size and none were significantly affected by firm age.  However, when we interact firm 
size and age categories with debt burden in the following set of regressions (reported in 
Table 8) we do find some variation across these characteristics.   
 
 
 
21 
Table 8 Debt Sustainability and Financial Factors: Marginal Effects with Group Interactions 
Below D/Y x 
Credit 
Rejected 
Loan 
Adjustments Default 
Receivable 
Days 
Increased 
Payable Days 
Increased 
Age 0-5 0.097 0.003 0.025 0.190 0.076 
Age 6 -10 0.092 0.269*** 0.122* 0.149 0.044 
Age 11-20 0.120* 0.094 0.247** 0.202 0.171* 
Age 20 + 0.097* 0.057 0.161** 0.211 0.098 
      Micro 0.111** 0.122* 0.271*** 0.197 0.097 
Small 0.078 0.002 0.085* 0.101 0.047 
Medium 0.095 0.082 0.165*** 0.169 0.056 
      Non-Exporter 0.097* 0.075 0.145** 0.182 0.106 
Exporter 0.103 0.105 0.168* 0.136 0.109 
      No Innovation 0.091* 0.048 0.140** 0.207 0.097 
Innovation 0.110* 0.138** 0.194*** 0.132 0.085 
      Manufacturing 0.080 0.143* 0.157* 0.286* 0.161* 
Const and RE 0.080 0.081 0.179** 0.266* 0.044 
Wholesale & 
Retail 0.077 0.070 0.109** 0.197 0.087 
Hotels 0.133 0.110 0.294** 0.080 0.029 
Other 0.152** 0.067 0.202*** 0.221 0.153* 
 
2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** indicates significance at % level, ** at 5% and * 
at 10%. 
 
The combined effects of debt burden with the firm characteristics show that older firms with 
high debt-to-income ratios are among the most credit constrained and also somewhat more 
likely to default.  This is in contrast to other papers finding that younger firms are more likely 
to be credit constrained but this is because these specifications are also including the direct 
effect coming from older firms being more likely to have larger outstanding debts and effect 
of higher debt-to-turnover ratios is therefore higher for these firms.   
 
Smaller firms have the largest combined effect of size and debt burden in increasing their 
probability of encountering credit rejections, loan adjustments and default.  Differences 
between exporting and non-exporting firms are only evident when looking at the probability 
of default, with exporters being more at risk than non-exporters if they have high debt 
burdens.  A similar pattern applies to the difference between innovative and non-innovative 
firms. 
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Table 9 Debt Sustainability and Financial Distress – Relative Risk Ratios 
 
Multinomial Logit Ordered Probit 
 
FD = 1 FD = 2 FD =3 FD = 4 Coeff 
Age 5- 10 -0.284 -0.564 -0.112 13.312*** -0.211 
Age 11-20 -0.193 -0.411 -0.033 13.814*** -0.084 
Age 20 + 0.029 -0.199 0.325 13.717*** 0.085 
Small 0.051 -0.220 0.111 -0.545 -0.079 
Medim -0.051 -0.276 -0.074 -0.337 -0.128 
Const and RE 0.247 0.391 0.411 0.937 0.284 
Wholesale & Retail 0.164 0.180 0.134 0.671 0.147 
Hotels -0.182 0.482 0.566 0.202 0.279 
Other 0.103 0.254 0.340 1.098 0.238 
Increase Turnover -0.130 -0.394** -0.351 -1.166** -0.288*** 
Exporter 0.122 0.453** 0.219 0.513 0.248** 
Innovation 0.123 0.429*** 0.345 1.459*** 0.329*** 
Profit Increased -0.677*** -1.474*** -2.520*** -3.289*** -1.195*** 
Log Debt t-1 -0.139** -0.125* -0.160 -0.034 -0.094 
D/Y 2.594*** 3.092*** 4.094*** 4.843*** 2.421*** 
 
2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** indicates significance at % level, ** at 5% and * 
at 10%. 
 
Combining the different indicators of financial difficulty into a single index, Table 9 reports 
the results of two different specifications.  The first is a multinomial logit, which reports 
separate coefficients for each value of the index all of which are relative to the base 
category of encountering none of the indicators.  The second specification is an ordered 
probit on the index as a whole.  We have a similar result to that from our examination of the 
indicators individually, with the debt-to-turnover ratio having a significant effect on 
increases in the number of financial difficulty indicators a firm experiences.     
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper uses firm-level survey data to examine how debt overhang following the financial 
crisis period affects the subsequent performance of SMEs.  We examine both the effects of 
the level of outstanding debt and the debt burden (measured as the ratio of debt to 
turnover). We test how these factors influence the employment and investment decisions of 
the firm, and the firm’s likelihood of encountering financial difficulties in the aftermath of a 
systemic financial crisis.   
 
Our results show that the level of debt is not in fact an inhibitor of firm performance, but 
conversely that it is generally associated with positive firm performance, indicating that debt 
financing has an important role to play in firms by facilitating investment.  However, credit 
overhang has significant negative effects if there has been a decline in the firm’s ability to 
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service its outstanding debt from its current levels of turnover.  We show that using an 
indicator of debt burden (debt relative to turnover) picks up significant negative effects on 
all firm performance outcomes, suggesting that this measure picks up potential problems 
with debt sustainability and overstretching of earlier credit commitments.   
 
There are some aspects of the effects of debt burden that we have been unable to explore 
due to data limitations but that may be fruitful avenues of further research.  As our dataset 
was not a panel, we could not observe when and for what purpose the initial debt was 
incurred which could be an important element of unobserved heterogeneity in our sample 
firms.  We are also unable to decompose how much of the current negative effects of debt-
to-turnover have been caused by declines in sales or changes in the cost or structuring of 
loans.  The results do, however, demonstrate that debt burdens can have an ongoing effect 
on firm performance and that some level of restructuring may be necessary for negative 
long-term effects on economic growth to be avoided.  
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Appendix – Additional Summary Statistics 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics for All Variables 
 
Overall 
Age 0 
to 5 
Age 6 
to 10 
Age 11 
-20 
Age 20 
+ Manu C & RE W & R Hotels Other 
Ln Emp 8.75 8.18 8.08 8.31 9.21 11.67 7.26 7.01 12.06 8.81 
Employ Change 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 
Inv 0.29 0.34 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.42 0.23 0.23 0.30 0.31 
Ln(I) 3.08 3.41 2.63 2.95 3.25 4.90 2.42 2.42 3.17 3.23 
D/Y 0.48 0.42 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.45 0.50 0.60 0.43 
Ln Debt t-1 6.9 5.8 6.7 6.6 7.3 7.5 6.3 7.3 8.5 6.1 
Innovation 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Export 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Profit  0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Turnover up 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 
 
2087 96 297 584 1109 269 244 669 212 691 
Financial Variables 
Credit rejected 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 
Default (Missed 
payment) 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.10 
Payable Days 
Increased 0.20 0.25 0.17 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.18 
Receivable Days 
Increased 0.32 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.36 0.40 0.33 0.13 0.33 
Loan 
Adjustments 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.14 
 
2059 91 294 579 1094 258 208 685 260 648 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Department of Finance Survey 
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Table A2: Employment and Investment Estimates on Sample with Zero Debt Firms Excluded 
 
Ln 
Employees 
(FGLS) 
Employment 
Change (OP) 
Extensive Margin 
(Probit) 
Intensive Margin 
(Tobit) 
Age 5- 10 -0.916 -0.001 -0.104 -3.400 
Age 11-20 -1.012 0.021 -0.066 -2.205 
Age 20 + -0.548 -0.018 -0.110* -3.674* 
Small 4.132*** -0.004 0.120*** 5.522*** 
Medim 5.806*** 0.068 0.348*** 12.407*** 
Const and RE -1.320** 0.010 0.021 1.017 
Wholesale & Retail -2.324*** -0.010 -0.020 -1.226 
Hotels 2.651*** -0.020 -0.010 -0.488 
Other 0.105 0.014 0.004 0.102 
Increase Turnover -0.022 0.199*** 0.013 0.752 
Exporter 1.191*** 0.000 0.124*** 4.253*** 
Innovation 0.295 -0.005 0.054** 2.087** 
Profit Increased 0.639** 0.134*** 0.087*** 3.354*** 
Default -1.751*** -0.028 -0.044 -2.161 
Credit Rejected -0.683 -0.056** -0.052 -2.341 
Log Debt t-1 2.044*** 0.013** 0.022* 1.045** 
D/Y -14.671*** -0.159* -0.513*** -20.961*** 
N 1,136 1,139 1,146 1,139 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** indicates significance at % level, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 
 
Figure A1: Scatterplots of Investment, Employment and Debt Burden 
Scatterplot of Investment and D/Y Scatterplot of  LnEmp and D/Y 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations using Department of Finance Survey  
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